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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, 18-year old Cody Herrera pled guilty to one count of
statutory rape.  He received a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, and the
court retained jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Herrera contends that this sentence represents an
abuse of the district  court’s discretion for two reasons.   First,  it  is  excessive given any view of
the facts.  Second, the court did not reach its decision based on an exercise of reason where it
rejected  the  conclusions  of  the  psychosexual  evaluator  in  favor  of  the  emotional  statements  of
M.M.’s mother, and where it unduly focused on the number of sexual partners Mr. Herrera had.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In November of 2014, seventeen-year-old Mr. Herrera began spending time with M.M.1
(Presentence Investigation Reporter (hereinafter, PSI),2 p.4.)  M.M. and Mr. Herrera had
continued to see each other despite M.M.’s parents’ objections and attempted to stop the
relationship.  (PSI, pp.73-78.)  On March 11, 2015, Mr. Herrera had just turned eighteen and
M.M. was fourteen.  (PSI,  p.4.)   The two were hanging out in her bedroom.  (PSI,  p.4.)   They
were  planning  to  watch  a  movie  and  Mr.  Herrera  began  touching  M.M.’s  breasts.   (PSI,  p.4.)
Mr. Herrera continued to touch M.M. and then he took off his shirt and clothes and removed her
sweatpants and underwear.  (PSI, p.4.)   Mr. Herrera then put his penis in M.M.’s vagina.  (PSI,
1 M.M. told Mr. Herrera at the time that she was sixteen years old.  (PSI, p.4.)
2 The term “PSI” refers to the Presentencing Investigation Report and any attachments,
including:  the Addendums to the PSI, the Psychosexual Evaluation, and letters of support from
Mr. Herrera’s family members and friends.  The page numbers in Appellant’s Brief correspond
with the pagination of the electronic file.
2p.4.)  M.M. began crying and told Mr. Herrera to stop, but Mr. Herrera reassured her and
continued until he ejaculated.3  (PSI, p.4.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Herrera was initially charged by Information with lewd conduct
with  a  minor  under  sixteen  years.   (R.,  pp.77-79.)   Pursuant  to  a  plea  agreement,  Mr.  Herrera
pled guilty to the amended charge of statutory rape.  (4/22/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.15-19; R., p.88.)  In
exchange, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, and
“Probation, Rider or to Serve based upon Psychosexual.”  (4/22/16 Tr., p.6, L.8 – p.7, L.3;
R., p.88.)  Defense counsel was free to argue for less.  (4/22/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-9.)  Mr. Herrera
pled guilty to statutory rape.  (4/22/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-18.)  Mr. Herrera’s
defense counsel asked the court to put Mr. Herrera on probation.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.13, L.13 –
p.14, L.7.)  The district court, retreating from the findings of the psychosexual evaluation to give
greater credence to the testimony of M.M.’s mother’s during her victim impact statement,
sentenced Mr. Herrera to nearly double the State’s recommendation:  fifteen years, with five
years fixed, but the court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Herrera.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-22;
p.20, L.2 - p.24, L. 14; R., pp.128-133.)
At sentencing, the district court threatened to sentence Mr. Herrera to fixed life, telling
him, “going to the Idaho State Penitentiary as a sex offender is not a good thing because you
3 Mr.  Herrera  consistently  maintained  that  the  encounter  was  consensual,  and  M.M.  never  told
him “no”, but that M.M. said otherwise because she was afraid of her mother and what people
would think.  (PSI, p.91.)  His polygraph results were consistent with his version of the events,
namely that he did not force his penis into M.M.’s vagina against her wishes and M.M. told him
“no” when he asked her if she wanted him to stop having sex with her because of her discomfort.
(PSI, p.93.)
3become Bubba’s buddy, and I think you know that,” implying Mr. Herrera would be raped in
prison by the older, larger, stronger inmates.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-21.)  The court then
commented:
I  will  tell  you,  sir,  that  if  you  are  ever  placed  on  probation  to  this  Court,  a
condition of that probation will be you will not have sexual relations with anyone
other than who you are married to, if you’re married, period.4
(01/27/17 Tr., p.23, Ls.8-11.)
On March 9, 2017, Mr. Herrera filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.137-140.)  Mr. Herrera
appeals from the Judgment of Conviction.  (R., pp.137-138.)
4 These comments made national headlines: http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-
love/a8693509/cody-herrera-rape-conviction-unmarried-sex-order/;
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/idaho-judge-suspends-child-rapists-sentence-orders-no-
sex-marriage-n717831; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/06/this-
judge-told-a-19-year-old-rapist-that-his-probation-would-include-no-sex-outside-of-
marriage/?utm_term=.5aac4ace2532.  Because Mr. Herrera is not yet on probation and, thus, is
not  yet  subject  to  a  condition  relating  to  whom  he  may  have  sex  with,  Mr.  Herrera  is  not
challenging the district court’s unusual admonishment on appeal.
4ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years,
with five years fixed, upon Mr. Herrera following his plea of guilty to statutory rape?
5ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years,
With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Herrera Following His Plea Of Guilty To Statutory Rape
A. Introduction
Mr.  Herrera  asserts  that,  when  sentencing  Mr.  Herrera,  the  district  did  not  base  its
sentence on reliable information in the sentencing materials, but on M.M.’s mother’s statements
which were unsupported by information in the record.  The district court further failed to reach
its decision based on an exercise of reason where the district court appeared to be sentencing
Mr. Herrera based on the number of sexual partners he had, rather than based on the facts of the
case before it.  Such speculation is unsupported in the record and, when combined with the
district  court’s  discourse  on  morality,  demonstrates  the  court  failed  to  act  with  an  exercise  of
reason.
B. Standard Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).  A district court abuses
its discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer limits
of that discretion, or does not reach a decision based on an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 601 (1989).
6C. The  District  Court  Failed  To Reach  Its  Sentencing  Decision  Based  On An Exercise  Of
Reason
The district court sentenced Mr. Herrera to nearly double the State’s recommendation—
fifteen years, with five years fixed, while retaining jurisdiction over Mr. Herrera.  (01/27/17
Tr., p.7, Ls.15-22; p.20, L.2 - p.24, L. 14; R., pp.128-133.)  Based on the court’s comments when
sentencing Mr. Herrera, it appears that the district court increased Mr. Herrera’s sentence above
the State’s recommendation because it relied on the opinion of M.M.’s mother that Mr. Herrera
was a predator, rather than the psychosexual evaluator’s conclusion that Mr. Herrera was
opportunistic, and because Mr. Herrera had numerous sexual partners in his lifetime.  In doing
so, the district court abused its discretion.
1. The  District  Court  Erred  In  Relying  On  M.M.’s  Mother’s  Opinion  That
Mr. Herrera Was A Predator, Rather Than The Expert’s Conclusion That He Was
An Opportunistic Offender
The psychosexual evaluator noted, “The examinee reports he did not find out the true age
of the victim until after the sexual contact occurred.  This was verified through available
documents, interview and testing.”  (PSI, p.104.)  The evaluator conducted six tests on
Mr. Herrera, including a polygraph (which he passed), interviewed Mr. Herrera and his mother,
and prepared a detailed 28-page evaluation in which he concluded that Mr. Herrera was
opportunistic and not a predator.  (PSI, pp.80-107.)  The evaluator found Mr. Herrera “seemed
most prone towards sexually offending adolescent females who the examinee is familiar with
and is in a relationship with.”  (PSI, p.80.)
However,  after  listening  to  M.M.’s  mother’s  emotional  statement  at  sentencing,  the
district court concluded that the psychosexual evaluation was mistaken in not designating
Mr. Herrera as a “sexual predator”:
7This defendant, by his own admission, has had 34, count them, 34 sexual
encounters with separate individuals.  I have never, never seen that level of sexual
activity between a 19-year-old, in this court system, and I’ve been doing this for
15, 16 years now.  That tells me that what Ms. Maxfield is trying to tell me is that
there is a level that this -- an attitude that this defendant has that, well, I’m going
to use young children for sexual gratification.  That does not seem to be consistent
with  what  the  psychosexual  report  says  because  I  don’t  think  they  didn’t  --  as  I
read it, H&H did not designate Mr. Herrera as a, quote, sexual predator, even
though there is certainly an argument that can be made for that.  So I’m having a
little trouble understanding why this evaluation came out the way it came out.
(01/27/17 Tr., p.20, L.14 – p.21, L.5.)
  M.M.’s mother’s told the court that she believed Mr. Herrera was a predator because he
pursued a relationship with her daughter, and because Mr. Herrera’s seventeen-year-old ex-
girlfriend got a protection order against him.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.4.)  However, M.M.
also sought to continue the relationship with Mr. Herrera, even letting him in her bedroom
window  the  night  of  the  incident.   (PSI,  p.4.)   Further,  included  in  the  PSI  was  a  copy  of  the
protection order for Mr. Herrera’s seventeen-year-old ex-girlfriend, and the petition providing
reasons why the protection order was being sought.  (PSI, pp.58-67.)  It had been completed by
Mr. Herrera’s ex-girlfriend’s mother, and stated essentially that the mother had looked through
Mr. Herrera’s phone and found a video of Mr. Herrera and her daughter having sexual relations
and Mr. Herrera had a weird look on his face.  (PSI, pp.58-67.)  In disregarding the psychosexual
evaluation to rely instead, on M.M.’s mother’s emotional statement that Mr. Herrera was “a
predator, preying on young girls,” the district court erred.
2.  The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Substantial Number Of Sexual
Partners  Mr.  Herrera  Had  Meant  That  He  Used  Young  Children  For  Sexual
Gratification
The district court further failed to reach its decision based on an exercise of reason where
the district court appeared to be sentencing Mr. Herrera based on the number of sexual partners
8he had, rather than based on the facts of the case before it.  Further, there was no indication in
any record before the court that Mr. Herrera’s 34 past sexual partners were “young children.”
At sentencing, the district court was clearly appalled by the number of sexual partners
Mr. Herrera had, saying:
This defendant, by his own admission, has had 34, count them, 34 sexual
encounters with separate individuals.  I have never, never seen that level of sexual
activity between a 19-year-old, in this court system, and I’ve been doing this for
15, 16 years now.
(01/27/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.16-21.)
 Although  the  court  leapt  to  conclude  that  Mr.  Herrera  had  an  attitude  that,  “well,  I’m
going to use young children for sexual gratification,” the record is devoid of any facts supporting
the court’s conclusion that Mr. Herrera’s 34 past sexual partners were “young children.”
(01/27/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-24.)
The district court then offered its opinion on the internet and morality:
When I was 19 years of age, the sexual proclivities of young people wasn’t
anything like I see today.  I think it is a direct consequence of the social media
system that we have in this county. . .
. . .
If I had my way, I would eliminate the internet, and we’d all have better lives, but
I can’t do that either.   It also says something about, I guess, the level of morality
in this country.  I can’t change morality.
(01/27/17 Tr., p.18, L.25 – p.19, L.12.)
The district court’s speculation that Mr. Herrera’s past sexual partners were “young
children” that he was using “for sexual gratification,” is unsupported in the record and, when
combined with the district court’s discourse on morality, demonstrates the court failed to act with
an exercise of reason.
9D. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  In  Failing  To  Fully  Consider  The  Mitigating
Factors Present In Mr. Herrera’s Case
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  In order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing
decision, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997).  A sufficient
consideration of the factors in this case shows the district court’s decision was excessive and not
an exercise of reason under the four goals of sentencing.
Mr. Herrera is immature for his age.  (PSI, p.85.)  Mr. Herrera’s mother believes he is at a
fifteen- or sixteen-year-old maturity level.  (PSI, p.85.)  The psychosexual evaluation reflected
that Mr. Herrera was “very emotionally immature” and has poor judgment overall.  (PSI, p.95.)
While his emotional immaturity and poor judgment does not excuse the fact that Mr. Herrera
pursued a dating relationship with fourteen-year-old M.M., these factors do help explain why he
was in a romantic relationship with a person several years his junior.5  (PSI, p.104.)  But,
immature as he may have been, Mr. Herrera was an adult (by nearly a month) and must pay the
price for his actions as an adult.
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Mr. Herrera was just one month past his eighteenth birthday when he committed the
instant offense.  (PSI, pp.3, 6.)  In addition to his young age, Mr. Herrera does not have any prior
felony convictions.  (PSI, p.6; 01/27/17 Tr., p.8, L.18.)  Prior to these charges, Mr. Herrera had
nothing more significant than traffic citations.  (PSI, p.6.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673
(Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two counts of drawing a check without funds.
Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673.  In Nice, the defendant pled guilty to the charge of lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90.  In both Hoskins and Nice, the court
considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions.
Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at  90.   The Hoskins Court ultimately found that
based upon the nature of the offense and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the
district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673.  Here,
Mr. Herrera did not have a criminal history beyond his traffic citations.
Another  fact  that  should  have  received  the  attention  of  the  district  court  is  that
Mr. Herrera has strong support from family and friends. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer
in his rehabilitation efforts).  Mr. Herrera’s family was present at his sentencing hearing and
several family members wrote letters to show their support of Mr. Herrera.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.14,
5 The psychosexual evaluator noted, “The examinee reports he did not find out the true age of the
victim until after the sexual contact occurred.  This was verified through available documents,
interview and testing.”  (PSI, p.104.)
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Ls.3-5; PSI, pp.7, 34-36.)  The letters from his friends and family reveal that he is a
hardworking, churchgoing kid.  (PSI, pp.34-36.)  Mr. Herrera received character reference letters
from his parents and his godparents.  (PSI, pp.7, 34-36.)
Further, Mr. Herrera expressed great remorse for his conduct and took responsibility for
his acts.  (01/27/17 Tr., p.14, L.16 – p.15, L.5; PSI, pp.5, 13.)  Idaho recognizes that some
leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts
responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121
Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
At sentencing, Mr. Herrera addressed the court:
Thank  you,  Your  Honor,  for  allowing  me  to  address  the  Court.   I  want  to
apologize for my actions.  I know I’ve made some wrong choices, and I take full
responsibility for them.  I attended my program, and I feel like I have some tools
that will ensure I make better and more responsible decisions in the future.
I am greatly remorseful for the pain I imposed on both families, and I want to take
a moment to apologize to [M.M.]’s parents.  I’m so sorry for the choices I have
made, and I am so sorry to you and the pain I have caused you and your family.
And to my family, I’m so sorry.  I’m sorry for the pain I’ve caused you as well as
the disappointment to you I’ve felt.  I want you to know I will try for the rest of
my life to be the son you can be proud of.
(01/27/17 Tr., p.14, L.16 – p.15, L.5.)
Mr. Herrera verbalized accountability for his actions at his pre-sentencing interview.
(PSI, pp.5, 13.)  Further, Mr. Herrera was proactive in getting treatment before he was
sentenced—he completed a six-week treatment program prior to sentencing.  (1/27/17 Tr., p.12,
Ls.10-18; Augmentation, p.1.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing
sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his
family in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App.
1988), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) (reducing sentence of first time offender
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who accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had been of good character before the
offense at issue); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that some leniency
is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his
problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character”).
The court sentenced Mr. Herrera without sufficiently considering all of the mitigating
factors present in this case.  Because the district court failed to consider all of these factors, it
abused its discretion in imposing a fifteen-year sentence, and retaining jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Herrera respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with an order that he be
placed on probation, or that it reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he
requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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